Non-governmental organizations: “Georgian Dream” is prohibiting challenges to election results
Local election observation organizations – the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), and Transparency International – Georgia – are responding to planned amendments to Georgia’s electoral legislation and state that “Georgian Dream” is prohibiting challenges to election results.
As stated in the joint statement of the three non-governmental organizations, they negatively assess a significant part of the mentioned legislative package. The NGOs believe the changes will result in less verifiable election results, limited judicial control, and even more centralized election administration.
“On 28 October 2026, on the initiative of six members of the Parliament of Georgia, a draft law was submitted to Parliament that provides for substantial amendments to the Organic Laws of Georgia ‘Election Code of Georgia’ and ‘Local Self-Government Code of Georgia’.
Local election observation organizations – the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, and Transparency International – Georgia – negatively assess a significant part of this legislative package. The changes will result in less verifiable election results, limited judicial control, and even more centralized election administration.
According to the amendments, the possibility of challenging the CEC’s summary protocol will be limited only to technical errors, the mandatory recount of ballots will be abolished, and decisions on the registration of observation organizations will be taken unilaterally. All of this will further reduce the already weak control mechanisms and increase the centralization of election administration. Additional procedural and advertising restrictions will worsen the conditions for participation in the electoral process and political competition.
Particularly alarming is the provision of the draft law according to which challenging the summary protocol of the elections drawn up by the CEC in court will be permitted only for the purpose of correcting mechanical/technical errors. Such a restriction at the stage of summarizing the final election results excludes disputes concerning systemic violations and their cumulative impact on the election results. Moreover, the systemic nature and scale of some violations may become apparent only through the joint analysis of data from different precincts and the electoral process as a whole. Accordingly, the possibility of disputing only individual precincts cannot replace full-fledged judicial control over the final results. The proposed amendment grossly restricts and weakens the guarantees of effective protection of the electoral right.
As can be seen from the explanatory note to the draft law, the preparation of the initiative was not preceded by public discussion or prior consultations with stakeholders, including the election administration. Fundamental revision of electoral legislation without broad professional and public consensus represents a vicious practice established by ‘Georgian Dream’ in recent years. This contradicts the electoral standards of the Venice Commission, according to which electoral reforms should be based on openness, predictability, and inclusive dialogue.
The presented initiative should be assessed in the context of the personalized law-making and repressive practices established in recent years, when legal rules are increasingly adapted to the interests of the ruling group, while mechanisms of public control are consistently weakened. Without effective control and accountability, the state loses public trust and is transformed into a system that advances narrow group interests instead of protecting common interests.
This document presents a joint legal assessment of the essential changes provided for by the draft law.
**Analysis and legal assessment of the essential changes**
**Summarization of results by the CEC and restriction of challenging the summary protocol** The current Election Code provides for a differentiated model of summarizing election results at the district and central levels. This ensures broad grounds for challenging summary protocols, which include procedural violations and circumstances affecting the voting results.
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, the final results of all types of elections will be summarized by the Central Election Commission (CEC) directly on the basis of the summary protocols of the precinct election commissions and court decisions (if any). At the same time, challenging the summary protocol drawn up by the CEC will be permitted only for the purpose of correcting a technical error (for example, if the data provided by the precinct or court decisions were incompletely or incorrectly transferred into the CEC protocol). A lawsuit on any other grounds will not even be accepted for proceedings, and the court will have the right to limit itself only to considering the issue of correcting the data.
Limiting the grounds for challenging the summary protocol of election results solely to mechanical/technical inaccuracies largely excludes judicial control over systemic violations at the stage of establishing the final results. As a result, the proposed changes will substantially narrow the scope of judicial control over electoral disputes and weaken the guarantees of effective protection of electoral rights. With regard to electoral subjects and observation organizations, it will limit the effective exercise of the right of appeal granted to them by law.
It should be noted that the systemic nature of electoral violations is not always revealed directly on election day or when the precinct election commission draws up the summary protocol of the voting results. Assessment of the scale of some violations and their possible impact on the election results becomes possible only on the basis of a joint analysis of the electoral process and the results obtained. Moreover, the Election Code sets short and strict deadlines for submitting complaints related to voting and vote-counting procedures. Consequently, the presented amendment may limit the possibility of detecting such violations, obtaining appropriate evidence, and responding to them legally, the existence or scale of which becomes apparent only after analyzing the overall election results.
Elections represent a single process taking place nationwide. Accordingly, when considering systemic disputes, it should be possible not only to assess violations identified in individual electoral precincts, but also to conduct a joint analysis of those violations that relate to the entire electoral process.
The standards established by the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR on electoral disputes are based on six fundamental principles, among which are access to legal remedies and ensuring the right to file a complaint against electoral violations. Along with ensuring the electoral right, the impartiality and independence of the bodies considering electoral disputes is a prerequisite for the fair, effective, and impartial consideration of electoral and political rights.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the post-2024 election amendments significantly restricted the activities of observation organizations and substantially reduced their ability to obtain evidence. The presented changes will worsen the situation.
**Abolition of the mandatory recount of results of 5 electoral precincts by district election commissions** The current Election Code establishes an imperative norm according to which each district election commission is obliged, no later than the 6th day after election day, to identify 5 electoral precincts on the territory of the electoral district by random selection at a commission meeting, open the packages received from the precinct election commissions of these precincts, and recount the voting results.
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, district election commissions will be fully released from the obligation to identify precincts by random selection and recount the results.
The rule of mandatory recount of five electoral precincts was one of the important institutional guarantees (an audit mechanism) for the prevention of electoral manipulations and verification of the accuracy of vote counting. Its abolition will reduce the transparency of the process and further weaken public trust in the official results.
**Transfer of the function of registration of observation organizations to the sole competence of the commission chairperson** Under the current Election Code, both the registration (or refusal of registration) of local and international observation organizations and the appointment of observers for the printing of ballots and summary protocols were considered and decided collegially by the relevant election commission (CEC / district election commission).
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, decisions on these issues will fall within the competence of the chairperson of the relevant election commission (CEC / district election commission).
Replacing the principle of collegiality with a unilateral decision increases the risk of subjective and politically motivated decisions. Members of the commission (including members appointed by parties) will be excluded from the decision-making process, which weakens the standard of mutual checks and balances and transparency.
**Reduction of the deadline for submission of financial reports** Under the current Election Code, an electoral subject that, according to preliminary data, receives the number of votes required by this law in the elections is obliged to submit to the State Audit Office a report on the funds used from the day of the appointment of the elections to election day inclusive, no later than the 12th day after election day.
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, this deadline is reduced and electoral subjects will have to fulfill this obligation no later than the 5th day after election day.
Reducing the deadline for submission of the financial report to 5 days will, in all likelihood, make it more difficult for electoral subjects to provide high-quality reporting.
It should be noted that if the State Audit Office considers a violation to be substantial and concludes that it may have affected the election results, it is authorized to submit a recommendation to the CEC to apply to the court so that the election results are summarized without taking into account the votes of the relevant electoral subject.
**Reduction of the registration deadline for observers and media representatives for the second round** Under the current Election Code, in the event of the appointment of a second round of the relevant elections, electoral subjects and media organizations have the right to appoint representatives no later than the 5th day before the second-round election day, while observation organizations may submit new observers within the same deadline.
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, this deadline is reduced and they will have this opportunity no later than the 7th day before the second-round election day.
In conditions where the time between the two rounds is already short, reducing the registration deadline by 2 days may hinder the work of electoral subjects, observation organizations, and the media. The explanatory note does not provide justification for the necessity of such changes.
**Restriction of the redistribution of free advertising time** Under the current Election Code, if any electoral subject has not used its share of airtime or newspaper space, the holder of a broadcasting license, an authorized terrestrial broadcaster, the Public Broadcaster, the Adjara Television and Radio of the Public Broadcaster, and a newspaper have the right to redistribute this time or space equally among the remaining electoral subjects.
Under the changes proposed by the draft law, broadcasters and newspapers will no longer have this right.
It should be noted that on the basis of legislative amendments implemented by ‘Georgian Dream’ in 2021, free airtime is not provided to a party that does not receive state budget funding at the moment of the appointment of the elections, and a party loses the right to receive such funding if the powers of half or more of the members of Parliament elected on its nomination were terminated early and it is impossible to recognize the powers of as many substitute members of Parliament so that the number of members of Parliament elected on the nomination of the said party exceeds half of the mandates of members of Parliament received by the same party. As a result of this rule, the political associations ‘Unity – National Movement’, ‘Coalition for Change – Gvaramia, Melia, Girchi, Droa’, and ‘Strong Georgia – Lelo, for the People, for Freedom!’ lost the right to receive state budget funding and free airtime.
Therefore, in this context, when the main opposition parties cannot benefit from free airtime, additional restrictions may further increase the inequality of opportunities between the ruling and opposition parties, which will not contribute to political pluralism. Instead of active parties rationally using airtime and newspaper space for better informing the public, unused resources will simply be lost, which may negatively affect smaller parties with fewer resources,” the statement says.
